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.Mallick observed the flights and reviewed the data with Champineand the Langley engineers.The project established a performance envelopefor the aircraft.like the F7U that created problems in carrier operation.In any case, the accidentsthat had occurred with the F8Us resulted in the complete wing assembly leavingthe aircraft.As a result, the variable incidence wing and its mechanism weresuspect.The F8U-1 had an actuator on the left side of the fuselage that extendedthe wing to the takeoff and landing position and retracted it to the cruise, orhigh-speed, position.The wing failures had occurred in the cruise high-speedcondition under high g-forces.The right side of the wing had a follower strut, but the main wing locking mechanism was on the left-side actuator.NASAquickly added a fuselage-mounted, high-speed motion picture camera on theleft side of the aircraft.It pointed at the junction between the wing and fuselage,which was normally very streamlined and smooth while the wing was retractedin the high-speed cruise configuration.Christopher Kraft served as the project engineer on the F8U-1.Chris wasa well-respected engineer who joined the Space Task Group in 1958 and latermade quite a name for himself as a Flight Director for manned space missions.With the F8U-1, Chris set up a series of flights, increasing the g s on the aircraftin gradual steps.The strain gauge data took some time to process.Therefore,engineers used the camera data to clear the aircraft to a higher g-level on the68 Jet Research at Langleynext test flight.There was an air of urgency with regard to helping the Navyfind the problem and correct it to restore the fleet aircraft to full readiness.I did not fly in the F8U-1 program, but Jack Reeder directed me to followthe program for my professional growth.I observed the test flights and reviewedthe data with the project pilot and engineers.When Bob flew a test flight thatincluded 4g turns, the camera data showed an opening between the wing andfuselage on the left side.Although it was less than one half inch, it was adefinite and unexpected movement.Some of the engineers thought it might bea normal movement, similar to a wing tip bending upward under load, but noone knew for sure.The big question involved whether to ground the aircraftfor a day or two to mount another camera on the right side of the fuselage toconfirm the motion.Chris was anxious to complete the program.As leader of theengineering group, he proposed flying to higher g-levels without the other camera.Bob, as project pilot, preferred a more conservative approach.He seemed reluctant,however, to disagree with the engineers.At the postflight analysis meeting, theconsensus seemed to sway toward another flight the following day.I was a test pilot in training with a little over a year s experience, but theidea of flying again without that starboard camera installed seemed risky tome.I couldn t sit quietly.Patiently, I waited for a break in the discussion. Iwouldn t fly that aircraft to a higher g tomorrow, I said, without the right-side camera. There was a silence in the room as the old heads all turned tosee where this comment came from.I could sense what they were probablythinking: What in the hell does this new guy know? In any case, anotherpilot s input was enough to sway the decision.The aircraft was grounded for afew days to mount the camera.The U.S.Navy had to wait.I suspect the Navy would have gladly waited if they had known the facts.I think Chris Craft was a little mad at me at that time.I wasn t mad at him, Ijust thought that it shouldn t fly without the camera.Bob Champine flew intwo or three days with the new camera added and he repeated the 4g maneuvers.When the film was analyzed, a few people caught their breath.The right sideof the wing at the fuselage was rising up over two inches, indicating a seriousunexpected wing twist.NASA quickly notified the Navy and the aircraftperformance envelope was limited to 4g s.Further investigation showed thatthe hold-down mechanism of the wing was inadequate on the right side andthe follower actuator was not contributing much, other than beauty.Amodification was in order.This experience provided me with a valuable lesson.It is always nice tobe right, and I certainly gained some credibility from the incident.The lessonlearned, however, was not to let peer pressure or politics keep me silent whenit came to flight safety.All through my career as a test pilot, I witnessed similarsituations where there was tremendous pressure for one reason or another tocontinue when I felt it was the wrong thing to do so.I always tried to make mydecision on the side of safety and conservatism, and take an extra day if it was69 The Smell of Kerosenerequired.I truly believe that is one of the reasons this old test pilot is alivetoday.As they told us years ago in the Navy: There are old pilots and thereare bold pilots but there aren t many old bold pilots around. I continued toexercise my philosophy when I became involved with flight test management.Although I generally gave the project pilot wide latitude for responsibility anddecision-making, there were times that I would override his decision on thebasis of safety if I felt that it was appropriate.Langley Joins the Space RaceThe nucleus of NASA was the old NACA.It was a government researchorganization that was truly not a political animal.The administrators of theNACA over the years were scientists who had worked their way to the top ofthe organization.The government funded the Committee (as it was called inthe early years), but its budget and visibility were relatively small.There wasvery little government pressure on the organization, a desirable situation for aresearch organization.It provided an atmosphere conducive to experimentationand invention.When I entered the NACA in June 1957, I had no idea that I was enteringat the end of one era and getting ready to begin a new one.The challenge ofaeronautical research was tremendous and it was what I had envisioned formy career when I became a test pilot.As a NACA research pilot, I was in avery enviable position.I experienced the challenge of flight test programsfound nowhere else in this country.When the Soviets shot their Sputnik into orbit in October 1957, speculationran rampant as people tried to guess how the U.S.would respond to this achievement.The various military services lobbied hard, vying for the responsibility of conductingthe U.S.space effort.Some thought the NACA a logical agency to direct such aprogram since the Committee had a core of fine scientists and research facilities.President Eisenhower and his administration charged the NACA with responsibilityfor space as well as aeronautics.In the reorganization, it became the NationalAeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).Langley was selected as the initial home of Project Mercury, the U.S.manned space effort.A large group of scientists were recruited and transferredfrom the aeronautics side of the house to the space side.It was obvious thatspace research was going to dominate the agency, due mainly to the scope ofthe task.The initial effort was referred to as the Space Task Group and it waslocated in some of the old NACA buildings on the southeast side of LangleyField
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